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A standard rational expectations model would give strong predictions about the behavior of
the nominal exchange rate at the beginning of a disinflation (a rise in interest rates): a
substantial initial appreciation, followed by a steady depreciation. It largely conflicts actual
observations, like the recent experience of Poland, Hungary, and Chile, where an initial
appreciation was not followed by any systematic depreciation. The paper tries to explore
whether rational expectations can be rescued by introducing noise and parameter learning. An
optimistic learning case (worse than expected inflation data every period), or the combination
of a pessimistic learning case (better than expected data every period) and a declining
proportional risk content of the interest rate offers a potential explanation.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper tries to resolve the inability of a frictionless rational expectations model (one that
builds on interest parity) to match the observed behavior of the nominal exchange rate at the
beginning of ”interest-rate-based” disinﬂations (a surprise interest rate hike).1 Interest parity
would imply a large initial appreciation (following the rise in interest rates) and then a gradual
depreciation (reﬂecting the equalization of expected returns on domestic and foreign bonds,
including the capital loss of holding domestic currency). Actual observations often show the
initial strengthening, but then the exchange rate follows no clear reversal. Let me illustrate the
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Figure 1: The Forint-Euro exchange rate and the interest diﬀerential
Figure 1 depicts the evolution of the Forint-Euro exchange rate and the diﬀerence of 3-month
Forint and Euro benchmark yields, in 2001-2002. As shown on the picture, the current phase
of disinﬂation started on May 4, 2001: the Forint, which used to have a ±2.25% band, was
allowed to move freely within a ±15% band. The immediate response was a heavy appreciation
1The terminology ”interest-rate-based disinﬂation” means that monetary contraction takes the form of an
initial interest rate increase, and then a gradual return to normal levels. The monetary authority sets the nominal
interest rate, and allows the exchange rate and money supply to be determined by markets. A purely ”money-
supply based disinﬂation” (when money supply is set, while the interest rate and the exchange rate is endogenous)
m i g h tl e a dt oad i ﬀerent interest rate behavior, thus a diﬀerent exchange rate prediction as well. The exchange
rate implications of an exchange rate based disinﬂation (the nominal exchange rate is set, and the other two
quantities adjust) are obvious.
2(though part of it might have reﬂected an initial undervaluation), in line with interest parity
(reﬂecting the attractive bond yield, which could not have appreciated the Forint further in
the previous narrow band). Later on, however, actual and predicted behavior diverged: apart
from three large depreciation episodes (two turmoils related to Argentina, and the consequences
of September 11), the exchange rate showed a general appreciating tendency (though after the
ﬁrst two episodes, there seems to have been a correction, but it clearly vanished after the third
episode). On the other hand, the excess bond yield was stable and substantial. Though not
shown on the ﬁgure, this episode indeed corresponds to a change in the disinﬂation process:
after a gradual decrease since the mid-nineties, inﬂation became ﬂat in 1999-2000, and then
returned to a decline. This decline, however, was not homogeneous, it involved a partial halt in
the beginning of 2002.
Figure 2 conveys the similar experience of Poland. The beginning of the sample is the
ﬁrst interest rate hike within the inﬂation targeting regime — the ﬁrst indication of a true shift
in monetary policy —, which was followed by three further contractionary steps. This period
observed a gradual strengthening of the Zloty, up to June 2000 (a quarter before the last rate
increase), which was followed by large swings, but without any tendency of reversal. Interest
rate diﬀerentials, however, remained large, regardless of Zloty interest rate changes. Inﬂation,
on the other hand, remained stubbornly high, initially it has even increased, which was ﬁnally



















































































































































































































































































































Figure 2: The Zloty-Euro exchange rate and the interest diﬀerential
3At ﬁrst glance, the experience of the Czech Republic around 2000-2001 shows an opposite
behavior: low, sometimes nearly negative excess yields and a dominantly appreciating nominal
exchange rate. If we are ready to assume a strong entry parity of the Czech currency in the EMU,
this behavior is consistent with interest parity: low (negative) yields and a strong expected future
exchange rate imply a gradual strengthening. Two qualiﬁcations, however, are necessary. The
ﬁrst is that the Czech National Bank, unlike its Hungarian and Polish counterparts, was actively
intervening in the foreign exchange market. The second is that this period is already after the
main disinﬂation episode of the Czech Republic. Looking back to 1998-1999, when inﬂation came
down from 10% to 3-4%, we have in fact a similar picture to Hungary and Poland: impressive
and stable excess yields during 1998, and a gradually appreciating currency. By the end of 1998,




























































































































































































peso-dollar exchange rate (log deviation from central parity) excess rate (deposit) excess rate (lending)
Figure 3: Chile: the Peso-Dollar exchange rate and the interest diﬀerential (smoothed and
adjusted for the crawling peg)
Chile had a similar experience in the early nineties: the exchange rate band was widened in
January 1992. As Figure 3 shows, this was followed by a heavy appreciation of the currency,
and apart from two depreciation episodes, the exchange rate was fairly stable afterwards, while
the interest premium remained large. The ﬁrst episode corresponds to mid-92, when signiﬁcant
capital controls were introduced. The other episode does not match any particular event, nev-
ertheless, it coincides with a period when the crawl of the central parity was unusually low, and
4inﬂation became ﬂat. One needs to be a bit careful in interpreting the actual numbers: unlike
in Poland and Hungary, Chile operated under a nonzero crawl of the central parity (continuous
devaluation). The exchange rate number corresponds to log deviation from this central parity.
The same adjustment is applied to interest rates: the pre-announced crawl is subtracted. Since
interest rates were indexed to realized inﬂation, Figure 3 displays smoothed series (applying a
Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter). Just like in the other two countries’ case, this period was part of a
broad disinﬂation process. In particular, the band was widened and realigned after a reversal
in the gradual decline of inﬂation. As a consequence, inﬂation returned to its downward path,
although with some plateaus.
A similar puzzle is the delayed overshooting ﬁnding of Eichenbaum and Evans (1995). They
document that after a monetary contraction, nominal exchange rates show a gradual apprecia-
tion, followed by a gradual reversal. The ﬁrst ﬁnding is in line with the Hungarian, Polish and
Chilean experience as well, but the similarity of the gradual reversal is not.
As put by Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1996), page 622: ”While conventional wisdom holds the
Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch model to be useful in predicting the eﬀects of major shifts in pol-
icy, its ability to predict systematically interest-rate and exchange rate movements is more
debatable.” The underlying force in that model is again the uncovered interest parity condition,
which predicts the same strong but empirically questionable behavior of the exchange rate.
The puzzlingly poor track record of uncovered interest parity is well known: a classical
documentation and interpretation is oﬀered in Fama (1984), and surveyed in Froot and Thaler
(1990) and Isard (1995), among others. This paper does not aim at any general evaluation or
rescue of the UIP hypothesis: the narrow objective is to focus on marked disinﬂation episodes.
To frame the discussion and main points, I will adopt a forward-looking ”small macromodel”
of an open economy (along the lines of Svensson (2000)). The motivation for this choice is at
least twofold: it allows for an explicit treatment of an interest-rate-led disinﬂation process,
highlighting the relation between inﬂation, interest rates and exchange rate behavior; besides,
this is also in line with the current major monetary framework for modeling inﬂation. Benczúr,
Simon and Várpalotai (2002b) oﬀers a general but simple description of inﬂationary dynamics
in small macromodels. In this paper, I will just summarize the necessary results, and using
a substantially simpliﬁed version, I address the behavior of the nominal exchange rate, under
Bayesian learning.
In particular, I want to investigate whether the following consideration can be a qualitatively
and quantitatively important factor in determining the nominal exchange rate. At the beginning
5of a disinﬂation, it should be quite clear for investors that the currency will oﬀer a medium-
term (a couple of years) excess yield, thus leading to massive capital inﬂows, and a large initial
appreciation (reﬂecting not just the immediate excess yield, but also its ”persistence”). Apart
from this ”obvious” step, a disinﬂation then continues with many uncertainties: about the
determination of the central bank, the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy tools (like the exchange
rate pass-through, the eﬀect of real interest rates on the output gap, and the disinﬂationary
eﬀect of the output gap, etc.), the persistence of inﬂationary expectations, just to name a few.
This means that every major data announcement represents an additional surprise, which can
counteract the trend depreciation of the currency. In a modeling language, this means that I
maintain rational expectations, but introduce noisy signals: I relax the assumption of perfect
foresight, model-consistent expectations.
A traditional channel for such uncertainties is the behavior of the central bank itself: how
much costs it is ready to tolerate, consequently, how aggressively it would react to changes
in inﬂation. There is a potential signal extraction problem here as well: markets do observe
inﬂation and interest rate data, but the central bank may (and often should) react to changes
only in core inﬂation, and neglect temporary inﬂationary disturbances. It means that markets
have to ”reverse” the decomposition done by the central bank to infer its true behavior. This is
essentially an asymmetric information problem.
In an inﬂation targeting framework, this asymmetry is less serious, since the regime operates
under a high degree of transparency. The central bank clearly communicates its motivations, the
d e c o m p o s i t i o no fi n ﬂation into permanent and temporary components is made public knowledge.
This does not mean that investors fully trust the announced disinﬂa t i o np a t ho ft h ec e n t r a lb a n k :
they might fear, for example, that there is a possibility of a regime realignment.
Even under the highest level of credibility, there is still room for uncertainties, which are in
fact shared by the central bank and market participants (symmetric, public information): after
a regime shift (moving into a disinﬂation, or changing the monetary policy framework), many of
the monetary mechanisms might have changed, or forces that used to be non-operational might
have become active, so their size or strength is not known precisely. The behavior and eﬀect
of ﬁscal policy, or the value of the equilibrium real exchange rate can be a similar source of
uncertainty. As shown in Benczúr, Simon and Várpalotai (2002b), the dynamics of inﬂation,
hence the behavior of interest rates and exchange rates can be quite sensitive to the precise size
of such eﬀects. Among many others, the eﬀect of the output gap on inﬂation, or the strength of
the exchange rate pass-through can be an abstract source of such aggregate uncertainty.
6An akin idea is followed by Lewis (1989): there is uncertainty about the change in the money
demand process, and markets learn the new situation only gradually. That paper succeeds in
quantifying the bias this learning causes (ex post), using actual data. Though my approach
is similar, the focus is shifted in many ways: ﬁrst, I want to concentrate on the speciﬁcs of
disinﬂations, which is a clear restrictive shock, and it is only its eﬀe c tb u tn o tt h ec h a n g ei t s e l f
that is uncertain. Second, by considering the links between inﬂation, interest rates and exchange
rates, the source of uncertainty will be more structural. For this reason, I need to model their
determinants and interdependence, in particular, to use an interest rate rule for the central
bank. This also enables me to track the performance and the components of the uncovered
interest parity condition itself (changes in the long-run nominal exchange rate, the cumulative
excess yield, and its risk content). Third, in my model, there is a feedback from imperfect
expectations to the inﬂation process, thus back to the signal extraction problem as well. Finally,
current monetary regimes use the nominal interest rate as their policy tool, so the endogeneity of
interest rates needs to be incorporated into the analysis.2 Unfortunately, the short time period
of potential observations, and the complications implied by my version of parameter learning
made it impossible to quantify this argument in any econometric sense.3
Since my objective is to explain a one-two year-long episode, the speed of learning is a key
concern. One may accept that it took ﬁnancial markets some weeks to digest changes, but is it
reasonable to have learning even after a year? In my view, I am on safe ground here: to learn
about structural parameters of previously inactive (or diﬀerent) forces, eﬀects, one essentially
needs new observations. For aggregate links like between inﬂation and output, or real exchange
rates, the relevant frequency is monthly, or rather, quarterly. Moreover, the exact nature of
such relationships is often unclear, and there is enormous noise in the observations. So even
after an entire year, one still has only twelve (or four) noisy observations, which will not yield
precise estimates. In Lewis (1989), where learning was about the money demand process, the
data suggested a 1-3 years span of learning. For aggregate inﬂation, I would expect the speed
of learning to be even slower.
Can the analysis of such a particular episode add anything to the general uncovered interest
parity debate? My story tells us that in these episodes, where a parameter changes (due to
2It is not straightforward to determine which interest rate should be used in the interest parity condition, or
how such an interest rate is inﬂuenced by the rate decisions of the central bank. To avoid these complications,
I assume that the central bank sets the relevant interest rate directly, and any additional interest rate can be
obtained by using the expected future rates.
3The main complication is caused by the nonlinearity of the structural model: all variables are linear in
inﬂation, but highly nonlinear in the underlying structural parameters. This makes the explicit calculation of
conditional expectations practically impossible.
7some regime switch), a previously inactive channel becomes operational, there is mistrust in the
central bank’s behavior, or market participants need to tell persistent supply and short-lived
demand ﬂuctuations apart, there is a substantial ex post bias in interest parity. If such episodes
are relatively long — measured in years —, then we may run into sample size problems even with
ten years of monthly or weekly data: the long-run average of the ex post bias is zero, but we will
have only 5-6 such episodes in our data, insuﬃcient for cancelling the bias. A further indication
is the ﬁnding of Lewis (1989), that learning can explain half of the observed bias of interest
parity in a nearly 3-year long period.
A n o t h e rr e l e v a n tq u e s t i o ni sw h e t h e rs u c hal e a r n i n gs t o r yc a nb ea p p l i e di np o l i c ys i m -
ulation, or forecasting models. If the source of the uncertainty is some structural parameter,
applicability is doubtful: it would require simulating the economy using the true parameter, but
both market participants and the central bank would be restricted to learn this parameter only
gradually. If, however, uncertainty is about the central bank behavior (less than full credibility
of the interest rate rule, for example), then it can be inserted into a simulation: the central bank
always behaves. but market participants do not take it for granted, and get to trust the bank
only gradually.
The uncertainties associated with early stages of a disinﬂa t i o n( o nt o po f” r e g u l a r ”s h o c k s
to output etc.) may also lead to a gradual entry of foreign bond investors. Though this can
be compatible with rationality,4 relaxing the perfect market assumption may end up being
necessary: Figures 1, 2 and 3 may also suggest that investors were responding only gradually
to high interest rates. That could have decreased the initial appreciation, and allowed the
strengthening later, or at least no deprecation. Still, it my view it is important to relax the
perfect foresight assumption ﬁrst, instead of relaxing the rationality of expectations.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section examines the perfect foresight behavior
of the nominal exchange rate. Section 3 describes the small macromodel framework for en-
dogenizing inﬂation. In Section 4, parameter learning is introduced into this framework. The
behavior of the realized exchange rate is analyzed in Sections 5 and 6, ﬁrst under the assumption
of no risk premium (a ﬁxed proportion), and then allowing for a systematically changing risk
premium content. Finally, Section 7 oﬀers some concluding remarks, and the Appendix contains
a formal but not fully rigorous treatment of the explicit learning process.
4With risk-aversion, investors would have a ﬁnite (less than perfectly elastic) demand for the currency. If they
receive a positive ﬂow of fresh funds to invest, that would imply a slow but steady capital inﬂow, but this eﬀect
is likely to be weak. Positive surprises (decreasing the riskiness of the currency) can lead to a continuous and
sizable inﬂow, thus a maintained appreciation period. This, however, is already within the area of our analysis:
one of our scenarios will have the same feature, with a changing risk content of domestic interest rates.
82 The rational expectations behavior of the nominal exchange
rate
In this section I explore the behavior of the nominal exchange rate at the beginning of an
interest-rate-based disinﬂation, under the assumption of model-consistent expectations (perfect
foresight if there is no uncertainty, rational expectations if there is any noise). These results are
completely independent from whether we believe that the economy is described accurately by a
small macromodel or not: I will use only rational interest rate and inﬂation forecasts, and the
uncovered interest parity condition (thus assuming risk neutrality and no market frictions), and
some form of purchasing power parity.5
2.1 Perfect foresight (no uncertainty)
Start from the interest parity condition for the nominal exchange rate (in logarithmic form):
st = st+1|t − it + φt,
where st denotes the current value of the nominal exchange rate, it is the current nominal interest
r a t e( i ne x c e s so fw o r l di n t e r e s tr a t e s )φt is a risk premium term,6 and st+1|t is the expected
exchange rate one period ahead. All time t expectations are taken at the beginning of period t.
At the beginning of disinﬂation, there is a surprise regime change: in the case of Hungary,
it was to let the currency out of a narrow band.7 Using rational expectations again, market
participants now have the ability to predict the central bank’s behavior under the new regime,
and all of its consequences (assuming that the wide band does not become binding). This means
that they form an inﬁnite sequence of expected interest rates, inﬂation, output gap etc. Iterate
5My assumption about the rationality of inﬂation expectations also involves a long-term stability assumption:
inﬂation must converge to its equilibrium value suﬃciently fast, thus the sum
P
πt —w h i c hd e ﬁnes the long-run
price level — exists. With noise in the model, it applies to expected values. For a linear model, it is a relatively weak
requirement: for the solvability and stability of such a model in general, inﬂation must disappear asymptotically,
which happens with an exponential speed. The role of this assumption is to ensure that the nominal exchange rate
has a long run value: with the real exchange rate reaching an equilibrium value, and the price level converging to
some constant, the nominal exchange rate is also constant.
6One can include a nonzero risk premium even under ”perfect foresight”: markets may price in the probability
of an event that changes the model itself. This event never happens along the equilibrium path, but its risk is
i n c o r p o r a t e di n t ot h ee x c h a n g er a t ee v e r yp e r i o d .S e c t i o n6o ﬀers a more detailed interpretation and discussion
of the risk premium term.
7Under the narrow currency band, the currency had no room for further appreciation, or a substantial reversal
later on. This situation was altered by the increased bandwidth. Besides, there were signs of an undervaluation:
see, for example, Halpern and Wyplosz (1997) on the real undervaluation in transition economies in general.
Kovács (2001) estimates the initial undervaluation around 5%, which is smaller than the initial appreciation of
10%.
9interest parity along this expected path:














The current exchange rate is the diﬀerence of the long-run expected exchange rate (we will see
its existence later on) and the cumulative (risk-free) excess interest rate. Interest rates need
to be adjusted for the current (”expected”) levels of current and future risk premia. Since it
is possible that new information emerges during the process of disinﬂation, for example there
is learning about the strength of certain monetary eﬀects, or how much costs the central bank
is ready to accept, φt+1|t and φt+1 may be in general diﬀerent from each other (and the same
applies to φt+2|t and φt+2|t+1 etc.).
The long-run value of the nominal exchange rate is determined by the equilibrium level of
the real exchange rate, implied by some form of purchasing power parity. Normalize this level
to zero. Since the real exchange rate satisﬁes
qt = st + p∗
t − pt, (2)
we must have
0=q∞|t = s∞|t + p∗
∞|t − p∞|t = s∞|t + p∗
t−1 − pt−1 −
¡




st = pt−1 − p∗
t−1 +
¡











The current level of the nominal exchange rate is thus determined by the current price level
diﬀerential (it is only a matter of normalization), the cumulative excess expected inﬂation and
expected interest rates. Therefore, the long run value of the nominal exchange is well-deﬁned
if there is a limit of the price level at inﬁnity, i.e., the series of excess inﬂation is summable
(converges to zero fast enough). In contrast to the real exchange rate and inﬂation, the long
run value of the nominal exchange rate cannot be considered as an equilibrium variable: for
example, it depends on initial conditions.
How does the exchange rate evolve through time? Assume that initially pt−1 = p∗
t−1,q t−1 =0
10(the process starts from the current equilibrium value of the real exchange rate8), then st−1 =0 .
Markets learn the regime change at the ”middle” of period t,a n dt h e nst is set by (4). It seems
safe to assume that interest rates are overall restrictive, meaning that the riskless real interest
rate is positive, then (4) implies an initial appreciation (nominal and real as well): not just
based on the current high level of the nominal interest rate, but the entire cumulative excess
yield should have its full eﬀect immediately.
After this ﬁrst surprise, without further news or noise — thus all expectations being equal to
the model-consistent realizations —, high interest rates imply a steady depreciation:
st+1 = st+1|t = st + it,
so if it is positive, there is a depreciation. This follows from interest parity: if high interest
rates are foreseen, then indiﬀerence between domestic and foreign bonds requires a capital loss
on domestic bonds, i.e., a depreciation. In the long run, the interest diﬀerential converges to
zero, and the exchange rate becomes constant.
This constant level (s∞) is necessarily weaker than the initial value st−1 =0 :f o rt h er e a l
exchange rate to return to its original level, any cumulative excess inﬂation must be exactly
oﬀset by the long-run nominal depreciation. We have positive excess inﬂation at the beginning,
so unless it becomes heavily negative for quite some time, the increase in the domestic price
level will be larger than that of foreign, so we must have a long-run nominal depreciation.
Having a negative cumulative inﬂation is not necessarily unreasonable, since this would refer
t oan e g a t i v ei n ﬂation on top of ”structural” inﬂation, as implied by foreign inﬂation and the
Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect (or any other factor that causes the equilibrium real exchange rate to
appreciate). Therefore, it need not mean a true deﬂation, but only a smaller than ”equilibrium”
level of inﬂation.9
For a general value of qt−1, the initial real exchange rate, and st−1 =0 , (3) implies that
s∞ = −qt−1 +
¡
πt + πt+1|t + ...
¢
.
8In case of an equilibrium real appreciation (or depreciation), let qt denote the deviation from the equilibrium
level. This appreciation then must be matched in the equilibrium path of inﬂation, thus πt is also the deviation
from the sum of foreign inﬂation and the structural excess inﬂation, caused by the real appreciation; and p
∗
t is
the hypothetical equilibrium price path, starting from the initial price level. Then (2) remains valid, and the long
run behavior of inﬂation and the real exchange rate is still consistent with a ﬁxed nominal exchange rate. This
procedure essentially means that we think of inﬂation and the real exchange rate only of domestically produced
and consumed goods.
9The equilibrium level of inﬂation is in general the foreign inﬂation level. Under an equilibrium real appreciation
(due to excess productivity growth, for example), the equilibrium level of inﬂation becomes higher as well. See
also footnote 8 on page 11.
11This means that if the initial real exchange rate was undervalued by, say, 5% initially (qt−1 =5 ),
then there can be an at most 5% long-run appreciation.
2.2 Introducing noise
These considerations remain mostly unaltered if there is noise in the economy, but without
any informational content. If both market participants and the central bank know the true
parameters of the system from the very beginning, then we can write identical equations for
the expected values of the same variables, and we get only mean zero deviations, with some
potential persistence though. The nominal exchange rate might show ﬂuctuations around the
depreciating trend, but its trend should be a gradual weakening.
To get a rational deviation from this strong prediction, one needs to introduce informative
surprises into the economy (rational learning). A straightforward ﬁrst interpretation is that
there are many parameters uncertain in the economy, and each new observation leads to new
estimates. If there is really new information in new data points, then this is a better estimate,
but if the new information comes in the form of a noisy signal, then the new estimate is still not
perfect.
Given the new estimate, market participants would rationally update their interest rate and
inﬂation forecasts, and the new level of the exchange rate would reﬂect this information, thus
being diﬀerent from the level of the exchange rate predicted in the previous period.
The interest parity condition would still hold between the current and the expected next pe-
riod exchange rate, but not between realized exchange rates.10 Moreover, the forecast based on
the old estimates will look biased ex post: knowing the direction of the update, one would have
predicted the prevailing appreciation or depreciation correctly. Now suppose that information
is always about a faster than expected disinﬂation, matched by a more than proportional reduc-
tion in anticipated future interest rates (assuming a higher than one inﬂation coeﬃcient in the
reaction function of the central bank). Then every period comes with a decrease in cumulative
real interest rates, thus an overall monetary easing, leading to a depreciation bias of the actual
exchange rate.
Looking ex post at many periods of the exchange rate (current and predicted) , one would
ﬁnd a signiﬁcant bias in the predictions, but that statement involves an ex post conditioning on
the fact that new information was always about an even faster disinﬂation. At any moment, the
10Looking at Reuters polls about market expectations of the HUF/EUR exchange rate, it shows no reversal
either, thus casting doubts even on this form of interest parity.
12market formed its best forecast based on current observations, and this forecast was updated
systematically in one direction.11 Ex post we do know that some uncertain parameter was higher
than initially expected, but due to noisy signals, the best feasible estimate was only converging
to this true value.
In ex post terms, Gourinchas and Tornell (2001) explores a very similar, though more general
idea behind the forward premium puzzle: in their scenario, market participants underestimate
ex ante the persistence of interest rate changes, which leads to the failure of interest parity. In
my model, people can be subject to a similar but ex post underestimation: based on their too
optimistic expected disinﬂation path, they also expected interest rates to return to normal faster
than the realization. The ﬁrst key diﬀerence is that they can also overestimate interest rates
ex post, if they were too pessimistic in their inﬂation forecast, and the second is that there are
no ex ante misperceptions (only imperfect information). In some sense, one can also view my
model as a structure behind interest rate expectations, and reinterpret misperceptions about the
persistence of interest rate changes as misperceptions about the persistence of inﬂation shocks.
To give this rough idea a formal framework, I will have to be explicit about the determinants
of inﬂation and interest rates. For this reason, I adopt a small macromodel description of the
economy, and introduce a potential for gradual learning.
3 The small macromodel framework
Here I brieﬂy describe the dynamic system deﬁning the economy, and summarize the behavior
of such a model based on Benczúr, Simon and Várpalotai (2002b). Then parameter uncertainty
and learning can be introduced explicitly.
3.1 The single equation reduced form
As explained in many places (like Svensson (2000), or Gali and Monacelli (2002)), the Calvo
sticky price model can be reduced to a convenient dynamic system, consisting of an aggregate
supply equation (Phillips curve), and aggregate demand relation, and a reaction function. The
11This can be also interpreted as a peso-problem: we would need a suﬃciently large number of observations
corresponding to both directions of updates, yielding a zero (unconditional) expectation of the exchange rate
prediction error. From a sample selection approach, when we observe mostly one direction of updating, we face
a nonzero conditional expectation of this prediction error — conditional on some parameter being higher than
originally expected.
13key ingredient of these models is the ”new keynesian Phillips curve”
πt = βyt + λEπt+1|t, (5)
where yt is the output gap, and λ is approximately one. This equation, however, means the
persistence of the price level, but not inﬂation itself. For this reason, practitioners usually
replace λ by one and Eπt+1|t by απt−1 +( 1− α)Eπt+1|t. Though this form can no longer be
given such solid microfoundations like the original expression (5), I would give two motivations.
One is followed by Svensson (2000): the original Phillips curve deﬁnes only a fraction 1 − α
of inﬂation, and the rest is set by inertia (πt−1). This also transforms β into (1 − α)β.T h e
other motivation is the sticky information framework of Mankiw and Reis (2001), (2002). It
replaces the fully rational expectation term Eπt+1|t the following way. A fraction 1−α of market
participants uses the correct expectation, and the rest adopts an obsolete forecast. Instead of
iterating the 1 − α fractions back to inﬁnity, one can simply replace the imperfect expectation
part by πt−1.
After introducing some convenient but irrelevant changes12 in the timing of variables relative
to Svensson (2000), our ”core” system can be written as follows:
πt = απt−1 +( 1− α)πt+1|t + βyt




it = τπt+1|t + ψyt.
Inﬂation (π) is given by a Phillips curve relation: there is a pure persistence term απt−1,a n d
the remainder is determined by expected inﬂation. Price rigidities, however, lead to a positive
eﬀect of output gap (y)o ni n ﬂation. Such Phillips curves can be derived from microfoundations
(with the exception of the inertia term). For my purposes, its simpliﬁed semi-structural (or
semi-reduced) form is all I need.
Output gap is set by aggregate demand: there is potentially an autoregressive term yt−1,
and a positive real interest rate (nominal minus expected inﬂation: it−πt+1|t)h a sad a m p e n i n g
eﬀect (through investment or consumption). Later on, when considering an open economy, the
real exchange rate will also have an eﬀect on the output gap (and also on inﬂation directly).
12To be precise, these changes are irrelevant regarding the impulse response of the system: once there are no
more shocks to the system, all past expectations are equal to the perfect foresight path. With shocks continually
hitting the economy, the lags with which they feed in will alter the dynamics. For the sake of a simple and
tractable exposition of the eﬀect of parameter learning, I work with no lags.
14Assuming that it is not just current interest rates but the inﬁnite sum of future interest rates
that matters, would give exactly the same modiﬁcation as the real exchange rate.
The last equation is the reaction function of the central bank. In its present form, it is a
Taylor rule: interest rates respond to inﬂation (in particular: to expected future inﬂation) and
the output gap. Though this might look restrictive, but it is suﬃcient for my exploratory pur-
poses. Moreover, as explicitly argued in Benczúr, Simon and Várpalotai (2002b), any quadratic
objective function of the central bank would lead to a linear reaction function, with as many
arguments as state variables (including persistent shocks).
For simplicity, I neglect the autoregressive term (γ =0 ). As explained in Benczúr, Simon and
Várpalotai (2002b), the dynamic properties of the autoregressive system would remain identical.
The full system reduces to
πt = απt−1 +( 1− α − βη(τ − 1))πt+1|t.
Naturally, there are many important, often crucial, eﬀects which are neglected in the model.
I am far from believing that, for example, ﬁscal policy, or the behavior of wages is a negligible
determinant of inﬂation. In order to illustrate my main point, however, a near-minimal model
is suﬃcient. One would deﬁnitely get richer but also more complicated dynamics with these
factors being present, but the story of the nominal exchange rate would remain the same.
Now extend the basic model to an open economy: this includes an uncovered interest parity
equation, and a role for the real exchange rate, either through the output gap, or directly on
inﬂation. We shall soon see that this modiﬁcation also covers the case when the output gap is
inﬂuenced not only by the current level of the real interest rate, but also its cumulative future
values.












Two main modiﬁcations were introduced here: the real exchange rate has an eﬀect on certain
variables, and we need to determine the value of the real exchange rate. Inﬂation is potentially
reduced by a strong real exchange rate (like in Leitemo (2000), Svensson (2000)), a real appreci-
ation (like in Buiter and Clemens (2001)), and a strong real exchange rate also depresses output
15(through the worsening of the trade balance, for example). The real exchange rate is then set
by a real interest parity condition (which is a simple rearrangement of a nominal interest parity
here).
The term ∆qt in the Phillips curve is only an addition to an already existing channel: from
interest parity, it is equal to the real interest rate, so the total reduced form eﬀect of the real
interest rate on inﬂation becomes −β(η − δ), instead of −βη.
From the viewpoint of inﬂation and exchange rate dynamics, it does not matter whether qt
aﬀects the output gap or inﬂation directly: its total eﬀect on inﬂation is κ + βφ > 0,a n dt h e
relative size of these two terms does not change the speed of disinﬂation (it is of course inﬂuential
f o rt h eo u t p u tg a pc o s to fd i s i n ﬂation). For inﬂationary dynamics, one can thus assume that
φ = δ =0 ,a n dqt enters only through the aggregate supply equation.
Substituting the reaction function into interest parity and iterating yields




Assume that the long run value of the real exchange rate is determined by purchasing power
parity (an exogenous assumption), thus q∞ =0 .T h e nt h eﬁnal form of the inﬂation equation
is:




3.2 Transforming Svensson[2000] into this framework
In the previous part, I have deliberately stripped down the shock part of the model. Mean zero
shocks would lead only to mean zero deviations, but if there are some predetermined variables
(like prices), then a shock would have a more complicated eﬀect during those periods when some
variables are preset. Therefore, the trend behavior of a disinﬂa t i o nc a nb ed e s c r i b e db ys u c ha
deterministic system, once the initial preset variables are allowed to incorporate shocks (which
happens after a ﬁxed number of periods). As an example, let us take a look at the deterministic
but potentially preset part of Svensson (2000).
Phillips curve:







In an impulse response, there is only one initial shock, which fully enters all expectations after
163 periods. Thus any expectation is the same as the realization, which leads to
πt+2 = αππt+1 +( 1− απ)πt+3 + αyyt+2 + αqqt+2.
The real exchange rate is determined by real interest parity:
qt+1|t = qt + it − πt+1|t.
Assuming that any foreign variable is in equilibrium, aggregate demand is given by
yt+1 = βyyt − βρ
¡
















Assume ﬁrst that potential output follows its trend, so yn
t is identically zero. If there was an
initial shock in potential output, dying out with some exponential speed, it would add an extra
equation to the system, but we shall see that it would introduce only an extra, exogenous term
in inﬂation.
Writing all equations as of time t:
πt = αππt−1 +(1− απ)πt+1 + αyyt + αqqt




qt = qt+1 − (it − πt+1).
It is clear that we have a two dimensional system here (assuming that the constraint on long-run
behavior pins down the future), so any previous shocks are summarized by π0 and y0.T h e na n y
linear reaction function can be written as
it = τπt+1 + ψyt.
This is exactly our speciﬁcation with nonzero autoregression (γ 6=0 )a n do p e n n e s s( βφ+δ > 0).
One needs to be more careful when collapsing all previous shocks into the two state variables,
πt and yt. If a shock has a nonzero persistence, then its value constitutes an extra state variable.
This is exactly the same issue as a shock to yn
t , the natural rate. Such an extra state variable,
say, zt, has its own exponential dynamics, leading to the closed form of zt =( γz)
t z0. Introducing
17am o d i ﬁed inﬂation variable ˜ πt = πt − x · zt, an appropriate choice of x implies that ˜ πt follows
the dynamics with zt =0 ,i . e . ,˜ πt = A1λt
1 + A2λt
2. Changing back to the original inﬂation
variable, its time path becomes πt = A1λt
1 + A2λt
2 + x(γz)
t z0. The only eﬀect of the term zt is
an extra component in inﬂation, but its dynamics is completely exogenous: the parameters of
the reduced form Phillips curve will inﬂuence x,b u tn o tγz; and the dynamics of ˜ πt is unaﬀected
b yt h ep r e s e n c eo fzt. Over the long run, it also means a mean zero disturbance term, though it
disappears only gradually, and not in a ﬁnite number of periods.
3.3 The general solution of such a model
Benczúr, Simon and Várpalotai (2002b) oﬀer a detailed analysis of the convergence and stability
properties of such models. Here I only restate the broad results. Decompose ﬁrst the model’s
behavior into an intrinsic component (essentially: setting τ =1 ), and the modiﬁcations coming
from monetary mechanisms (when τ 6=1 , there are many ”product terms” in the reduced form
inﬂation equation, like βη —r e ﬂecting the eﬀect of interest rates on inﬂation, via the output
gap variable; etc.). The key observation is that these modiﬁcations are relatively small: each
monetary eﬀect is small, and the combined (product) eﬀect is even smaller. This means that one
should understand the intrinsic part ﬁrst, and then look at the eﬀects of moderate perturbations
around it.
Intrinsic dynamics are heavily inﬂuenced by the relative weight of backward and forward
looking inﬂation terms in the Phillips curve. Though this relative weight can be viewed as re-
ﬂecting price and wage adjustments, formal microfoundations usually give such an interpretation
to the output gap parameter, leaving the inﬂation persistence reﬂecting an empirical regularity.
If the forward looking part dominates the backward looking term (its weight, 1−α, is larger
than half), then inﬂation is programmed to disappear: from any starting point (initial inﬂation,
output gap etc.), it converges to zero with an exponential rate of α
1−α per period. If the backward
looking part dominates, then the intrinsic dynamics does not take the economy to zero inﬂation:
inﬂation is either constant or explosive.
This phenomena is in fact not due to the success or failure of a credibility-based disinﬂation.
For given relative weights, market participants must have model-consistent expectations (full
model-credibility), and they must believe that the economy will not start along an explosive
p a t h .T h i sb e l i e fi sa l r e a d ys u ﬃcient for disinﬂation in the α < 0.5 case, there is no need for any
active interest rate policy. If α ≥ 0.5, then a neutral interest rate policy is no longer suﬃcient
for eliminating inﬂation. Credibility might be inﬂuencing α, the weight of the backward looking
18term, but since we do not have any good theory for the presence of the persistence term, it is
even more diﬃcult to argue for the determinants of its importance.
Adding the extra eﬀects of monetary mechanisms can only slightly modify the dynamic
behavior (formally: the eigenvalues of the dynamic system are continuous, thus they cannot
change much if we slightly perturb the system). If α < 0.5,t h e nt h es p e e do fi n ﬂation remains
around α
1−α (one can write this as λ = α
1−α ±o(τ − 1)) T h i ss p e e di sn o t” t o os e n s i t i v e ”t ot h e
parameters of monetary mechanisms, or the activism of the central bank’s reaction function:
once the speed is below 1, a further acceleration (decrease) will have relatively little eﬀect on
the halving time of inﬂation.
A completely diﬀerent picture emerges if the backward looking term dominates: intrinsic
dynamics gives an eigenvalue of one, so we need strong monetary mechanisms, active interest
rate policies to decrease this eigenvalue (it can be written as λ =1− o(τ − 1)). Any small cut
below one will have dramatic eﬀects on the halving time of inﬂation and on cumulative output
gaps: the dynamic behavior of the system is very sensitive to precise estimates of monetary
eﬀects, which oﬀers an important role for learning and surprises.
Benczúr, Simon and Várpalotai (2002b) also give a characterization of stable reaction func-
tions. If the system is at most two-dimensional, then any linear reaction function (in particular:
any optimal reaction function which comes from a constant coeﬃcient quadratic objective func-
tion) can be viewed as a general Taylor rule: it = τπt+1 + ψyt. Partly in contrast with the
standard view, the condition of τ > 1 is required for the saddle path stability of the solutions,
but not necessarily for the asymptotic boundedness of inﬂation (π∞ =0 ) : t h es a d d l ep a t h
stability here means that π0, y0 (if there is autoregression in the aggregate demand equation)
a n dt h ew e l l - b e h a v e da s y m p t o t i c s( π∞ being zero, or at least bounded) of the system uniquely
determine the models’s behavior. If there is an autoregressive component in aggregate demand,
then the exact condition on the reaction function becomes τ > τcrit =1+
2ψγ
β(1+ηψ).
Should this condition fail, the system then becomes either unstable (from general initial con-
ditions, it explodes) or globally stable: the two initial conditions and the asymptotic (terminal)
condition is not suﬃcient to pin down the system. From any set of initial conditions, there is
a continuum of inﬂationary paths, all converging to zero. Fixing one further condition (e.g.,
π1) resolves the indeterminacy, but market participants need to coordinate on such a particular
solution. In the case of an open economy model, we usually get global stability, while the closed
economy case gives instability. The diﬀerence between these two lies in the long-run assumption
of (relative) purchasing power parity.
19For my purposes, the most canonical parameter choice is the most suitable: τ > 1 (or
τ > τcrit)a n dα > 0.5. Then we have a well-behaved dynamic system, and do not have to
worry about whether some of the results are related to the indeterminacy property. Moreover,
the high sensitivity of inﬂation dynamics to τ-τcrit, and more importantly, to further monetary
parameters (η, κ etc.), oﬀers an excellent room for a coexistence of large inﬂation surprises and
relatively slow learning.
4 Parameter learning in the Phillips curve
4.1 The learning process
For convenience, assume that the only inﬂuence of the central bank over inﬂation is through
the composite real exchange rate channel (the coeﬃcient κ from the reduced form equation).13
Now suppose that there is a ”true” parameter κ in the Phillips curve πt = απt−1 (1 + εt)+
(1 − α)πt+1|t + κqt, but its precise value is not known to the market or the central bank. For
simplicity, assume that the prior distribution is also common for market participants and the
central bank. Then every period constitutes a new observation for estimating (learning) κ:b u t
due to some additional pure noise, there is a signal extraction problem, leading to a common
Bayesian update of the distribution of κ. As time goes on, this distribution should converge to
the truth.
One can explicitly model this learning process: start from some prior distribution about κ,
and a true value. We also need a source of noise, with its distribution. Then it is possible to
derive the updating rules. This unfortunately gives us only a random variable, a function of
the per period realization of the noise. It should in general move towards the true value of κ,
unless we have some extreme realizations of the noise, when agents rationally attribute such
an observation more to κ than to noise. Simulating many potential time proﬁles, the sample
average then describes the average evolution of inﬂation and the exchange rate (alternatively,
one might be able to calculate this expected value explicitly). Note that this average is an
expectation conditional on the true κ, so it is not equal to the inﬂation path expected by agents
at any point in time.14
13There is a direct eﬀect in the model: a strong real exchange rate decreases inﬂation, for example, through
import prices and adjusting domestic relative prices (an adjustment towards the equilibrium real exchange rate).
There is also an indirect eﬀect, through depressed output.
14In fact, one could take one more step of simpliﬁcation, and assume directly that the uncertainty concerns the
parameter λ of the reduced form equation πt = πt+1 (λ + εt). It would also simplify signal extraction, since one
would not face a ”simultaneity” problem: with an uncertain κ, the real exchange rate depends on the current
distribution of κ,b u tt h ei n ﬂation process, therefore the posterior of κ,i si n ﬂuenced by the real exchange rate.
20A convenient and tractable shortcut is the following: assume that for any time t, there is
av a l u eκt which describes the current knowledge of the market. This means that the market
forms a point estimate of κ, and uses that parameter to obtain its forecast. That might not
lead to fully correct expected value calculations: in period t+2 , the expected value of inﬂation
already depends on higher moments of the κ distribution. Using the point estimate implicitly
assumes that these higher order terms are relatively small. In the Appendix, I will sketch a
formal but incomplete argument that κt can be constructed as a certainty equivalent of the
current distribution of κ, at least for the current average value of realized inﬂation, real and
nominal exchange rates, and the nominal interest rate: calculating the true expected future
real interest rate path and inserting it into real interest parity, the implied qt and πt is equal
to the values calculated using κt. For any other variables in the more distant future (qt+1,f o r
example), one should use a diﬀerent point estimate κ0
t. For such variables, using κt g i v e su sa
biased, but still reasonable forecast. Forecasted real exchange rates and real interest rates still
satisfy the real uncovered interest parity condition.
Asymptotic learning then requires that κt → κ.15 We can insert this parameter into the
deterministic model: whenever there is a time t expectation term, expectations are obtained in
a near-rational but not model consistent way, by replacing κ with κt.16 There can be two main
cases for learning: pessimistic — when the starting value of κt is smaller than the truth, the
market believes that disinﬂation is relatively slow, monetary policy is ineﬀective, and learning
means a gradual revision upwards (κt % κ, faster disinﬂation, more eﬀective monetary policy),
and optimistic — κt & κ. Again, the Appendix contains a formal but not fully complete argument
for the certainty equivalent κt converging monotonically to the true κ value.
As explained in Section 3, if α > 0.5 (the backward looking term dominates in the Phillips
c u r v e ) ,t h e nt h es p e e do fd i s i n ﬂation is increasing in κ. So one would expect that the optimistic
case would imply too low expected inﬂation (too fast expected disinﬂation), and each observation
would push κ down, decreasing the expected speed of further disinﬂation. Optimistic agents are
continuously subject to negative surprises, they keep updating their inﬂationary and interest
rate expectations upwards; and exactly the opposite for the pessimistic case.
In other words, there is trade based on imperfect information, and it interacts with signal extraction.
15Intuitively, it is clear that we have complete asymptotic learning: rewrite the Phillips curve as πt/πt−1 −α−
(1 − α)πt+1|t/πt−1 = κqt/πt−1 + ε
0
t. All variables are observed every period, the parameter α is known, and ε
0
t
is an orthogonal mean zero error term, with a known distribution. As t →∞ ,e v e nt h eO L Se s t i m a t eo fκ from
this equation is consistent — and that estimator even neglects the speciﬁc distribution of ε
0 and the prior of κ.
16One might want to call them predicted values, instead of expected values. Since κ inﬂuences most variables
in a nonlinear way, no single, common point estimate can yield unbiased predictions for all variables. I will deﬁne
κt in a way that the prediction of the inﬁnite sum of real interest rates is unbiased, thus the resulting value of qt
(and hence πt) is consistent with rational expectations.
214.2 Optimism, pessimism and the speed of inﬂation
What is the eﬀect of parameter uncertainty and learning on the speed of disinﬂation? One can
interpret the question at least two ways. The ﬁrst concerns the eﬀect of parameter uncertainty
relative to full information. The answer to this interpretation is ambiguous: in the pessimistic
case, expected inﬂation is large, but that implies a large real interest rate and also a stronger
real exchange rate. The ﬁrst eﬀect indeed increases inﬂation (relative to the perfect foresight
κ = κt case), but the latter works against it. Everything is ﬂi p p e di nt h eo p t i m i s t i cc a s e ,b u t
we get the same ambiguity at the end.
The following example shows that the real exchange rate eﬀect might dominate in the pes-
simistic case, implying that too much pessimism initially achieves faster disinﬂation than perfect
foresight. If κt ≈ 0,t h e nπt+1|t ≈ πt−1,s oπt ≈ πt−1 + κqt. On the other hand, it+j|t − φt+j|t −
πt+j|t ≈ (τ − 1 − φ)πt+j|t,a n di n ﬂation converges to zero at a speed of (1 − o(κt))
j,s ot h es u m
of the geometric inﬂation series can be arbitrarily large as κt → 0. This means that as κt → 0,
qt →∞ .T h ei n ﬂationary eﬀect of pessimism relates to the coeﬃcient λ =1of πt−1 (instead of
λ < 1), and it is ﬁnite, while the anti-inﬂationary eﬀect (the nominal and also the real exchange
rate) can be arbitrarily large.
From our purposes, however, the relevant question is whether a smaller than true point
estimate implies a lower than expected inﬂation. For a given real exchange rate, the pessimistic
case indeed means that inﬂation is smaller than expected by market participants or the central
bank (due to κ > κt). There is, however, a link between inﬂation and the real exchange rate:
using (4), we get
qt = st + p∗
t−1 − pt−1
= pt−1 − p∗
t−1 + πt +( 1+φ − τ)
¡





t−1 − pt−1 =: πt + It|t.
Notice that under reasonable assumptions (cumulative inﬂation is positive, and τ > 1+φ),
It|t < 0. Writing it back to the inﬂation equation, we get








qt|t = πt|t + It|t





Comparing realized and expected inﬂation, their relation is still not clear: if κ > κt (pessimism),
then πt has both a smaller numerator and a smaller denominator (and the opposite for κ < κt).
The relation πt > πt|t boils down to
κt
¡




απt−1 +( 1− α)πt+1|t + It|t
¢
.
The bracket term equals απt−1 +(1− α)πt+1|t +qt −πt = qt (1 − κ), which is negative if κ < 1
and qt < 0. The realistic order of magnitude for κ is evidently κ < 1 (one cannot expect a one
percentage point immediate decrease in inﬂation from a real exchange rate being one percentage
point stronger than its equilibrium level). If we further assume that the central bank wants to
maintain a positive real interest rate all the time (which looks plausible during a disinﬂation),
then the real exchange rate shows an initial appreciation, then a gradual return to zero — thus
it is always negative.
This implies that κt > κ is equivalent to πt > πt|t,a n dκt < κ to πt < πt|t.O n e c a n
easily show that a similar result applies to the it = τπt choice of the reaction function: the only
diﬀerence is that κt > κ is equivalent to |πt| >
¯ ¯πt|t
¯ ¯, and vice versa. Using the explicit solutions
of Section 5.2, one can give also give a formal proof for the it = τπt case. In summary, it is true
that parameter-pessimism is also inﬂation-pessimism (a too low expected κt implies a too high
expected inﬂation), therefore a lower than expected inﬂation number should rationally lead to
an update of κt upwards.
235 The behavior of the realized exchange rate
5.1 Realized exchange rate movements
Let us turn now to realized exchange rate movements:
st = q∞|t + pt−1 +
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st+1 = q∞|t+1 + pt +
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st+1 − st = it − φt | {z }
st+1|t−st
+ q∞|t+1 − q∞|t | {z }
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+ πt+1 − πt+1|t | {z }
inﬂation surprise having
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change in the long-run
nominal exchange rate
.
Suppose ﬁrst that there is no risk premia, or at least, it is constant. Section 6 oﬀers a
detailed interpretation and investigation of the risk premium term. Then the nominal exchange
rate changes by the (riskless) interest rate, the change in the expected (or perceived) equilibrium
value of the real exchange rate, plus the cumulative eﬀect of inﬂation and interest rate surprises.
We see that a surprise in the equilibrium real exchange rate moves the nominal exchange
rate one in one, unless it also inﬂuences the inﬂation and interest rate process. If it is only
the deviation from the equilibrium real exchange rate that matters for inﬂation and the output
gap, and interest rates depend only on inﬂation and output, than there is no indirect eﬀect of a
surprise to q∞|t: looking back at the full macromodel (6), we ﬁnd that wherever qt appears, it
corresponds to the deviation from q∞|t. The real interest parity condition in fact also contains a
hidden q∞|t on the right hand side, which means that a change in q∞|t has no eﬀect on qt−q∞|t,
πt, and all other included variables. Consequently, a change in q∞|t moves the absolute level of
the real exchange rate, hence also the nominal exchange rate, one in one, and there is no indirect
eﬀect. For this reason, I will concentrate on the more complex, hence more interesting case of
inﬂation surprises, and assume that q∞|t ≡ 0.
In the pessimistic case, the sum of inﬂation diﬀerentials is negative. If we assume that the
central bank follows some sort of a Taylor rule, in the sense of reacting more than one in one
to inﬂation, then the interest rate sum is also negative, and its absolute value is larger than
that of the inﬂation sum (note that the interest rate sum goes from t +1 , while the inﬂation
sum starts at t +2 , since the interest rate is assumed to depend on expected inﬂation next
24period). Altogether, these two terms act as a surprise monetary easing, leading to an even
larger depreciation of the currency than implied by it.
There is a ”free” inﬂation surprise term as well, corresponding to period t+1. This surprise,
due to the assumption on the reaction function, does not imply any interest rate change. Should
this term dominate the total eﬀect of the two inﬁnite sums, then the nominal depreciation will
be smaller than it. If, however, we further assume that the time t real interest rate is at least
as large as the risk premium, then it −φt −πt+1|t > 0. This implies that there is still a nominal
depreciation, not less than realized inﬂation and the total (positive) eﬀect of the two inﬁnite
sums.
If we assume that it depends on πt (and not on πt+1|t), then we do not have this extra ”free”
term, because it+1−it+1|t is exactly (more than) proportional to this surprise. Therefore, in the
pessimistic case, we always have a steady weakening of the currency after the initial appreciation,
u s u a l l ye v e no nt o po fit.
A similar argument shows that everything is reversed in the optimistic case: inﬂation is
higher than expected (predicted), so the two inﬁnite sums are positive, and their joint eﬀect is
negative. Due to negative inﬂation surprises, there is an overall restrictive monetary surprise,
so the nominal depreciation is smaller than implied by the nominal interest rate (assuming that
the ”free” term does not dominate the inﬁnite sums).
At a ﬁrst glance, one might say that the ﬁrst year of the current Hungarian disinﬂation story
corresponds to the pessimistic case: inﬂation was decreasing faster than expected by market
participants (based on Reuters poll observations), maybe even faster than predicted by the
central bank. This would oﬀer no remedy for the permanently strong nominal exchange rate.
T h e r ea r e ,h o w e v e r ,s i g n so ft h eo p t i m i s t i cc a s ea sw e l l :i n i t i a lb a n kf o r e c a s t sw e r eu s i n ga
high parameter of exchange rate pass-through, which, according to the forecasting framework,
implied a fast disinﬂation. By the end of 2001, these estimates were under downward revision, in
s p i t eo fb e t t e rt h a ne x p e c t e di n ﬂation data for 2001, thus attributing a large part of the current
success to favorable exogenous shocks. The ”deterministic” part of inﬂation — the one aﬀected
by monetary policy — may actually have shown the symptoms of the optimistic case.
255.2 Operationalizing the small macromodel framework
Given any initial condition πt−1,i n ﬂation is determined by the conditional-expectations Phillips
curve:
πt = απt−1 +( 1− α)πt+1|t + κqt.
Working with the it = τπt reaction function, the real interest parity condition becomes




= q∞ − τπt − (τ − 1)
∞ X
s=t+1









Market expectations (predictions) are formed through a similar equation, but with κ replaced
by κt:




The process πs|t is thus follows a perfect foresight small macromodel with parameter κt. The
characteristic equation of this system is
λ(1 + κtτ)=α +( 1− α − κt (τ − 1))λ2 − κt (τ − 1)
λ3
1 − λ
0=α − (1 + α + κtτ)λ +( 2− α + κt)λ2 − (1 − α)λ3.
In the same fashion as explained earlier for the general case, if α > 0.5 (the backward-looking
term dominates), τ > 1 (active monetary policy), and κt ≈ 0 (small magnitude of exchange rate
eﬀect), then this equation has two divergent and one convergent roots.17 Denote the convergent
root by 1 − λ(κt), which can be computed easily for any given value of α and τ. Therefore,
πt−1+j|t = πt−1 (1 − λ(κt))
j . We also have




17D u et ot h ee x t r at e r m−τπt in qt, this remains true even for values of τ slightly below one.
26Plug this back to the original Phillips curve:
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Again, this can be computed easily, thus we can get πt, qt given πt−1. Based on the previous
discussion, and explicitly shown in the Appendix, the values of πt,i t are indeed equal to the
conditional expectation of πt and it, where expectation is taken with respect to period t noise
(εt), but conditional on the true value of κ.A l s o ,qt and st are equal to the real (and nominal)
exchange rate coming from interest parity using the correct expectations — but all the other time
t and future (expected) variables are only biased predictions.
One would then specify various choices of α, τ, and ”learning scenarios” κt → κ (either
from above, or from below). That leads to a numerical path of qt, πt over time, from which we
can infer pt = pt−1 + πt (p0 =0from normalization), and ﬁnally, the evolution of the nominal
exchange rate st. The object of interest is its behavior: the size of the initial appreciation, and
how much reversal follows.
Similar though somewhat more complicated general results apply to the case where there
is an extra real interest rate channel (through the output gap), and there is autoregression in
the output gap. From a numerical solution point of view, the modiﬁcations are straightforward:
using the modiﬁed characteristic equation, we get a diﬀerent function λ(κt),b u tw ec a nu s e
that expression for πt+j|t, plug those values into the Phillips curve, and get the numerical path
of πt, qt and st.
5.3 Numerical results for the optimistic case
Accepting ﬁrst the optimistic case, the next question is whether one can ﬁnd reasonable pa-
rameter values, or at least orders of magnitude, at which the nominal exchange rate can stay
nearly constant. For simplicity, assume that it = τπt, i.e., neglect the ”free” term. Then,
using again the general results summarized in Section 5.2, we have πt+1+i|t = πt (1 − λt)
i+1,
πt+1+i|t+1 = πt+1(1 − λt+1)
i = πt (1 − µt)(1− λt+1)
i.H e r e1−λt is the eigenvalue of the time-
27t expected inﬂa t i o n( w i t ht h ee x c h a n g er a t ec o e ﬃcient being κt), 1−λt+1 is the same but as of
time t+1, while 1−µt describes the change from πt to πt+1(with the inﬂation expectation term
coming from a κt+1-equation, but the real exchange rate is multiplied by the true coeﬃcient κ).
Then we must have λt > λt+1 > ¯ λ, since market predictions about the speed of disinﬂation
are continuously downgraded, but the realized speed still remains above the perfect foresight
speed, ¯ λ. It is also expected that µt > ¯ λ, since optimism should ”usually” mean that inﬂation
disappears faster than under perfect foresight (if the real exchange rate channel is not too strong,
the expected inﬂation term should dominate). Finally, we have µt < λt, since realized inﬂation
is higher than expected (predicted) inﬂation.
Plugging everything into the equation for nominal exchange rate movements:



















It immediately shows that as inﬂation becomes smaller and smaller, the nominal exchange
rate path becomes ﬂatter and ﬂatter. We would like to ensure that the coeﬃcient of inﬂation is
negative, or at least near zero, since that would imply an appreciating, or nearly stable currency.






































since λt < 1, λt > λt+1 and µt < λt. If the left hand side is positive, then it is necessarily larger
than the right hand side, so there will be a nominal depreciation, at least as large as realized
inﬂation.
I si tp o s s i b l ef o rt h el e f th a n ds i d et ob en e g a t i v e ?I tw o u l di m p l y
λt+1
λt + µt < 1.I no t h e r
words, the updated prediction about the speed of disinﬂation must be much smaller than the
previous prediction, and realized disinﬂation must also be relatively slow. So we need a large
inﬂation surprise and a slow disinﬂation.18
On the long run, it cannot be maintained: limt→∞ λt > 0, so
λt+1
λt → 1 and µt > 0,b u t
18 Making the left hand side negative may not be enough, because it might also involve further decreasing the
right hand side. For example, if λt, λt+1 and µt are ”small”, the right hand side is not ”too small”: if all terms
are approximately 0.1, their diﬀerences are around 0.01, then its value is around -1.
28the condition may hold at early stages of the disinﬂation. Even then, we need the additional
constraint that τ times the left hand side (τ ≈ 1.5) is greater than the right hand side. Repeating
the approximate calculations from footnote 18, we would get a positive left hand side (λt and
λt+1 are nearly the same); while if the diﬀerence of the λsi sa l s oa r o u n d0 . 1( w h i c hm a k e st h e
right hand side even more negative!), the left hand side is approximately -0.4, so even τ =2is
not enough for keeping the exchange rate constant.
The real issue is whether we can ﬁnd a suitable set of model parameters (α, τκ true)a n da
learning path (κt & κtrue) which would give the desired nominal (and real) exchange rate proﬁle.
Matching the previous discussion, it turned out that such a scenario should exhibit a relatively
slow disinﬂation (high persistence — α, and a weak exchange rate channel — κ), large inﬂation
surprises (substantial drops in κt each period), and an aggressive reaction function (high τ).
The following choice leads to a particularly good-looking exchange rate behavior: α =0 .8,
τ =2 , κ1 =0 .019, κ2 =0 .011, κ3 =0 .007, κ4 =0 .005, κ5 =0 .004, κ6 = κtrue =0 .003.
T h ec h o i c eo fα =0 .8 is in line with the calibration of Svensson (2000), and it implies a
relatively large persistence of the inﬂation process. The Taylor parameter τ is around the
”standard” choice of 1.5−2. It is hard to access the values of κ directly, since it is an extremely
reduced form parameter. Its quantitative meaning is that a 5% real overvaluation leads to a
quarterly disinﬂation of 10− 1.5 basis points. The best guide is to look at the implied speed of
disinﬂation: the halving time of inﬂa t i o ni sa r o u n dt h r e ey e a r s ,w h i c hm a yb es l i g h t l ys l o w ,b u t
not unreasonable.19
The initial condition of quarterly excess inﬂation is 1.5%, roughly matching the corresponding
Hungarian number of early 2001. The time unit is a quarter of a year. All data is in percentage
points, at a quarterly level. The results are depicted on Figure 4.
Before discussing the results, let me emphasize once more that all the future (expected)
variables are in fact forecasts, and it is only the one-period ahead forecast of the nominal
exchange rate which is constructed to be unbiased. The true expected values would show
a similar time proﬁle (decreasing inﬂation, a depreciating nominal and real exchange rate),
but the actual numbers would slightly diﬀer. Those expectations would satisfy the ”expected
value” version of the interest parity conditions (linking expected exchange rate movements and
expected interest rates). Nevertheless, the forecasted variables also satisfy interest parity, but in
a ”prediction” version, linking predicted exchange rate movements and predicted interest rates.
Panels A and B show the behavior of the real and nominal exchange rate: after a large
19Benczúr, Simon and Várpalotai (2002a) discusses the adaptation of a similar macromodel to Hungary.
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Figure 4: Numerical results for an optimistic learning scenario
initial appreciation, though there is an expected nominal and real depreciation every period,
realizations show a further real appreciation, and a near steady nominal exchange rate. By
construction, both exchange rates switch to the perfect foresight depreciation path after period
six, when parameter learning ceases (or at least, becomes negligible).
Panel C illustrates the deviation from interest parity: from period 2, both exchange rates are
expected to depreciate: the nominal rate should change according to the excess domestic interest
rate, while the true real interest rate is diﬀerent from the predicted one, but its sign and order
of magnitude is similar. In periods 2-6, however, there is an inﬂation surprise every period, thus
a shock to the expected (predicted) inﬂation and interest rate path, and the long run expected
nominal exchange rate. Consequently, realized exchange rate movements are systematically
lower than interest diﬀerentials.
Panel D depicts the speed of disinﬂation and size of the inﬂation surprises. The halving
time of inﬂation is approximately 12 periods (3 years), which is not extremely fast, but not
implausible. Every period, there is an expected (predicted) inﬂation path starting from the
current realization. One period later, the realization is higher than originally expected. This
30leads to an upward revision of the inﬂa t i o nf o r e c a s t( b a s e do nal o w e rp o i n te s t i m a t eo fκ).
Changes in inﬂation forecasts lead to changes in interest rate forecasts (by the mechanical link
of is|t = τπs|t)a n ds∞|t. This process continues until the true value of κ is learned. In theory, this
would require inﬁnite periods, but practically, we can assume that all agents learn κ accurately
in a couple of periods, and further updates are negligible.
6 Changing the risk premium
6.1 "Endogenizing" the risk premium
The results so far suggest that inﬂation surprises alone can account for the behavior of the
exchange rate, keeping the risk premium ﬁxed. Still, for many reasons, I also want to explore
the implications of a changing (partly endogenous) risk premium term. The starting point is to
clarify the meaning and interpretation of risk premium in the model.
Strictly speaking, the only model-consistent source of uncertainty of domestic bond returns
comes from the parameter uncertainty and the noise ε, but the implied exchange rate volatility
should not matter for risk neutral investors. One could still think about the premium as a
correction term, reﬂecting some risk aversion. There can be many further, not modeled sources
of risk: liquidity, or default risk, for example. These factors can be taken as exogenous from the
viewpoint of the model, so they can be considered as ﬁxed.
A major part of the risk premium, however, is likely to come directly from the disinﬂation
process itself: if its evolution (in terms of speed, costs etc.) substantially diﬀers from predictions,
then the central bank may decide to implement another regime change (or, within the model, it
may change the Taylor coeﬃcients). This means some form of less than perfect credibility, but
not necessarily a distrust in the central bank itself: based on new information, an update on
model parameters should imply an update of the optimal reaction function, even for the same
central bank objective function.
This premium,therefore, represents expected losses from a hypothetical monetary realign-
ment, which takes the economy ”out of the model”. This event never occurs along the equi-
librium path, but its risk is incorporated into the exchange rate every period. It does not
necessarily implies a loss for all investors, but it looks more plausible that the possibility of such
a realignment means an expected loss for bond investors.
Since the probability of such a realignment decreases as the disinﬂation process matures, it
is reasonable to set the risk premium proportional to inﬂation. As a starting point, assume that
31this ratio is a constant: φt+i|t = φπt+i|t. Keeping the same reaction function it = τπt as before,
the total eﬀect of inﬂation, interest rate and risk premium surprises becomes





For a ﬁxed φ, it is identical to a less aggressive reaction function, therefore, all previous consid-
erations equally apply here. We saw that, in the optimistic case, a larger τ is more likely to give
constant exchange rates, so we do not get any help from the risk premium term.
In the pessimistic case, it may look possible that τ − 1 − φ and τ − 1 have opposite signs,
meaning that the no-premium behavior shows a continuous depreciation, while the risk premium
behavior implies further appreciation. The problem with this argument is that τ − 1 − φ < 0
would mean that the riskless real interest rate is negative for positive inﬂation levels, but then
the central bank is in fact not following a restrictive policy. This is not very sensible, moreover,
if the backward looking term dominates in the Phillips curve, then such a reaction function does
not lead to asymptotic disinﬂation.
Another problem here is that the assumption of τ − 1 − φ ≈ 0 indeed implies near constant
exchange rates (for a ﬁxed inﬂation path), but it also eliminates the initial appreciation (unless
it is entirely due to the correction of real undervaluation). Besides, a too mild reaction function
leads to slow disinﬂation, increasing the expected inﬂation path πt+j|t,a n dt h ee ﬀect on the real
interest rate (τ − 1 − φ)π is ambiguous. A less aggressive reaction function might even imply a
bigger initial appreciation, and then a severe reversal, if the increase in π dwarfs the decrease in
τ − 1 − φ.
Figure 5 illustrates the implications of a nonzero but ﬁxed risk proportion φ, without any
parameter learning. Formally, it is equivalent to working with diﬀerent τ Taylor coeﬃcients,
since it is only τ −φ−1 that matters. For the parameter choice of α =0 .8, κ =0 .003,t h eﬁgure
contains the results of four diﬀerent τ − φ values: 1.5, 1.3, 1.1 and 1.20 As transparent from
Panel A, there is a reasonable tradeoﬀ between the initial appreciation and the speed of the
following depreciation for the real exchange rate: decreasing τ leads to a ﬂatter real exchange
rate path, but still allows for some initial appreciation.
Panel B, however, shows that this is not the case for the nominal exchange rate: a decrease
in τ leaves the slope nearly unchanged, while it decreases the initial appreciation. Since I am
particularly interested in the behavior of the nominal exchange rate, the assumption of nonzero
20Because of the it = τπt assumption, qt = −τπt +( 1− τ)
P
πs|t, which is nonzero even for τ =1 .W i t ht h i s
reaction function, one can get a disinﬂa t i o ne v e nf o rτ =1 , and the critical level is approximately τ =1− κ.
32but ﬁxed φ seems to be insuﬃcient for my objectives.
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Figure 5: Varying the risk proportion
One can relax the constant proportion assumption in at least two ways. One is that even





diﬀerently, the risk premium content (proportion) of the current interest rate is not the same as
that of tomorrow’s. This ratio may be declining (as disinﬂation continues, inﬂation gradually
declines, decreasing the probability of a monetary correction), increasing (due to parameter
uncertainty, there is a ”probationary” period at the beginning, when the central bank may
tolerate relatively large initial costs, and engage in a correction only later, once it is clear that
the large costs are not due to bad luck); so a combination of these eﬀects may imply any arbitrary
pattern (for example, an initial increase, reﬂecting the probationary period, and then a gradual
decline).
Another approach could be to postulate
φt+i|t
πt+i|t = φt: for given information, the ratio is ﬁxed,
but new information brings about a change in the risk proportion. In the optimistic case, it seems
plausible that the arrival of negative surprises increases φ,a n dt h eo p p o s i t ef o rt h ep e s s i m i s t i c
case. In a credibility buildup story, we do not even need the extra parameter uncertainty: as
time goes on, markets subtract less and less from nominal interest rates (the Taylor coeﬃcient
τ), since they believe more and more that the bank would indeed stick to that particular reaction
function. This again corresponds to a gradual decline of φ. The next section elaborates this
framework.
336.2 The proportional risk premium case
The optimistic scenario comes with a per period increase in the risk content of interest rates,
which points to a further weakening of the exchange rate: the eﬀect of the interest rate surprise
(increase) is partly oﬀset by a higher risk content. Since I did manage to explain the exchange
rate behavior without this increase of the risk premium, those results would stay similar though
weaker with a changing premium. Overall, this would not provide us with a new explanation
for the observed exchange rate behavior: negative inﬂation surprises alone would remain the
driving force, and changes in the risk premium would only work against this ﬁnding.
In the pessimistic case, however, the eﬀect of the risk premium is in the desired direction: as
a result of better than expected data, the predicted interest rate path is revised downwards, but
its risk content also decreases. So it is possible that the total change in the ”riskless” interest
rate is equal to the total surprise in inﬂation, which would lead to an unchanged exchange rate
( o ri fi td o m i n a t e st h ei n ﬂation surprise, it leads to an appreciation). This would constitute an
alternative explanation: the inﬂation surprise itself would point to further depreciation, but the
drop in the risk content can potentially counter this eﬀect, and keep the nominal exchange rate
constant. Notice that the same argument applies to the credibility interpretation, but without
the opposite force of the surprise in κ.
Plugging φt+i|t = φtπt+i|t into the expression for the change in the exchange rate:

















Note that the time t ”eﬀective” Taylor coeﬃcient, 1 − τ + φt, multiplies the diﬀerence of two
inﬂation sums, while the change in the risk content multiplies such an inﬂation sum alone. If
the surprise in inﬂation is small compared to total inﬂation, and if both the level and the change
of the risk proportion is relatively large, then we may get st+1 / st.
Use the expressions for πt+1+i|t and πt+1+i|t+1 we obtained earlier:
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34As a promising ﬁrst calibration exercise, suppose that λt,λt+1,µ t,µ t−1 ≈ 0.05,a n yd i ﬀerence
is approximately 0.01, τ =1 .5, φt ≈ 0.4, φt+1 ≈ 0.3, pt − p∗
t =0(normalization). Then
st ≈− 1.9πt−1 (a large initial appreciation) and st+1 − st ≈ 0 (no depreciation next period).
Finding realistic structural parameters, learning and risk premium scenarios proved to be
a much less fruitful experiment than in the optimistic case with ﬁxed risk content. The major
reason is that one needs a relatively large drop in the risk content (φt) ,w h i c hi nt u r nr e q u i r e s
a high Taylor coeﬃcient (τ), thus high initial interest rates. This either gives too large inﬂation
surprises (which work against the desired appreciation), or too low inﬂation (which weakens the
eﬀect of the decreasing risk premium). One may produce higher inﬂation by weakening the real
exchange rate channel, but that also leads to a higher sensitivity of inﬂation to estimates of κ,
hence, larger inﬂation surprises again. It is still possible to balance these two eﬀects, and achieve
an initial appreciation, followed by 2-3 periods of nearly ﬂat nominal exchange rate,21 but then
it quickly reverts to depreciation.
Figure 6 reports numerical results for the following set of parameters: α =0 .7, τ =1 .5,
φ1 =0 .4, φ2 =0 .3, φ3 =0 .2, φ4 =0 .1, φ5 =0 .1, φ6 =0 .05, φ7 = ... =0 , κ1 =0 .003,
κ2 =0 .0032, κ3 =0 .0035, κ4 =0 .004, κ5 =0 .0045, κ6 = κtrue =0 .005.
Panels A and B show the evolution of realized and expected (forecasted) exchange rates.
The real exchange rate initially appreciates, and then is expected to depreciate slowly (since
riskless real interest rates are very low: τ − φ1 − 1=0 .1). In period 2, because of the inﬂation
surprise, realized risky rates are lower than expected, but realized riskless rates are higher, due
to our assumption of the surprise drop in the risk premium. This leads to an even stronger real
exchange rate, and a slightly appreciating nominal exchange rate. The same applies to period
3, but after that, the change in φt is too small to reverse the depreciation.
Panel C depicts the violation of uncovered interest parity ex post: instead of the heavy
depreciation implied by excess yields, realized exchange rates exhibit some further appreciation,
a n dt h e nr e t u r nt ot h ep e r f e c tf o r e s i g h tp a t h .
Panel D shows the path of realized inﬂation, and inﬂation surprises. Risky rates are pro-
portional to inﬂation (both expected and realized), but due to changes in φt, the evolution of
riskless rates is more complicated. One can see in Panel E that the overall change in riskless
rates is initially restrictive (higher than expected), and then it becomes expansionary (lower
than expected).
Finally, Figure 7 shows the results for a scenario where there is a per period (unexpected)
21Having substantial drops in φt for many periods requires a very high τ, thus unrealistically high risky interest
rates.
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Figure 6: Numerical results for a pessimistic learning scenario with declining risk content
drop in the risk premium content (φt), without a corresponding downward revision of κ.I t s
interpretation is that the credibility of the central bank’s behavior (reaction function) is building
up only gradually: though investors observe τ, they do not fully believe that it would not decrease
in the future, thus they subtract φt out of τ. As time goes by, and the central bank follows its
plan, the trust of investors gradually increases, and φt declines.
The ﬁgure corresponds to the following parameter values: α =0 .7, τ =2 , φ1 =0 .9, φ2 =0 .7,
φ3 =0 .5, φ4 =0 .3, φ5 =0 .1, φ6 = φ7 = ...=0 , κ =0 .005. The results show no qualitative
diﬀerence relative to Figure 6, though the nominal exchange rate is even ﬂatter. The major point
of this credibility interpretation is that it makes the method applicable for policy simulation:
the original explanation with parameter uncertainty is hard to operationalize, since one would
36need to use the true parameter value in the simulation, and still assume that market participants
learn it only gradually. With a gradually increasing credibility, it is more acceptable to ”program
in” these surprises.
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Figure 7: Increasing credibility: unexpected drops in the risk premium content
7C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
There are many potential qualiﬁcations of the analysis. From the viewpoint of theoretical
attractiveness, one could treat the learning eﬀect precisely (either by Monte Carlo simulations for
the average realized variables, or proving the missing pieces in the construction of the ”certainty
equivalent”), or model the source of the risk premium. The ﬁrst is likely to leave most of
the results unaltered; while the second may involve nontrivial interactions between the risk
37premium and the rest of the model. Unfortunately, there is no obvious choice for an endogenous
risk premium term.
An unpleasant feature of my model is the long-term behavior of the nominal exchange rate:
plugging back all the ”structural” terms, the long-term nominal exchange rate is determined
by the long-term equilibrium real exchange rate (equilibrium real appreciation, plus a potential
initial undervaluation), and the cumulative total inﬂation. If we are above structural inﬂation,
then the long run nominal exchange rate can at most reﬂect the initial undervaluation of the
real exchange rate — and markets seem to expect a larger long-run appreciation.
One can of course drive inﬂation below the structural level (thus get a long-run appreciation),
in fact, the EMU criteria is likely to involve such a decision. This requires some modiﬁcation
of the reaction function: i = τπ would make little sense, because a negative π would imply




,w i t hπtar < 0.
Besides this point about parameter uncertainty and learning, the actual behavior of nominal
exchange rates around disinﬂations are likely to be inﬂuenced by a large number of additional
factors. Some of them might not be restricted to disinﬂations: for example, Benczúr (2002)
estimates a bond pricing version of interest parity in a developing country sample, of the form
it = α + βi∗
t + λ4ee
t+1,
and ﬁnds a signiﬁcantly less than one coeﬃcient of the benchmark interest rate (β ≈ 0), but a
near one coeﬃcient of the exchange rate risk (λ ≈ 1). Since here we keep foreign rates roughly
ﬁxed, such a modiﬁcation can give at most a ”level shift” of the exchange rate proﬁle, but not
a ”slope shift”.
Can we get to market expectations directly — from Reuters polls, for example? Then one
could check whether UIP holds with measured expectations. If yes, then one should try to
explain why it makes sense to have biased forecasts and trade based on them, or whether the
bias is only an ”ex post bias”.22 If it fails, then we need even further explanations, like slow
capital inﬂows, or EMU speculation (see below).
If capital inﬂows respond slowly to extra gains (which is in fact related to a changing risk
premium explanation) — with some adjustment cost-type story, one might get exactly the desired
outcome. This is already more speciﬁct oad i s i n ﬂation: there is a foreseen medium-term excess
22Gourinchas and Tornell (2001) address the issue of ex ante misperceptions about future interest rates, which
can be translated into misperceptions about future exchange rates.
38yield on the currency, and still, it is arbitraged away only slowly. Can we make such a story
consistent and rational (e.g., with cost of convincing German small investors to let their money
go into accession countries)?
Finally, in the case of Hungary and Poland (and the other former or current EU accession
countries), the level at which the country might join the monetary union oﬀers an extra scope
for exchange rate speculation: at entry, there will be a ”forever ﬁxed” exchange rate, the level of
which is uncertain, moreover, the evolution of the ”free market” exchange rate might inﬂuence
this entry parity. Understanding and modeling this interplay should be a key research topic.
Though this explanation may even be a dominant determinant of exchange rate behavior in EU
accession countries — it cannot apply to Chile.
8 Appendix
8.1 Deﬁning the ”certainty equivalent” of the realized exchange rate and
inﬂation
I will illustrate the procedure for a simpliﬁed Phillips curve speciﬁcation:
πt = πt−1 (1 + εt)+κqt−1.
Inﬂation equals last period’s inﬂation, a random shock proportional to past inﬂation, and the
disinﬂating eﬀect of an overvalued real exchange rate (of the previous period). The assumptions
of full inﬂation inertia and a lag in the eﬀect of the real exchange rate simplify the derivations
and the signal extraction problem, while the proportionality of the noise is necessary to have
a tractable solution (it essentially makes the evolution of the entire system proportional to the
initial level of inﬂation).
The real exchange rate is still determined by real interest parity:
qt−1 = Et−1[qt] − (it−1 − Et−1πt)=Et−1[qt] − τπt−1 + Et−1[πt]. (8)
Assume that κ can take two values: κH or κL.23 As of time t − 1, the current (posterior)
distribution of κ is binary, with Pt−1 (κ = κL)=λt−1, Pt−1 (κ = κH)=1−λt−1. After observing
πt, all agents (market participants and the central bank as well) update their distribution for κ,
23The general case could be treated in a similar though more complicated way. One should then derive the
posterior density of κ, and all functions of the probability λt−1 would become functionals of the pdf λt−1 (x).
39which can be summarized in the probability λt (λt−1,πt−1,πt,q t−1).
Let us look for a solution of the form qt−1 = f (λt−1)πt−1.T h e n πt = πt−1 (1 + εt)+
κf (λt−1)πt−1,s oEt−1[πt]=πt−1 + Et−1[κ]f (λt−1)πt−1. Plugging everything into (8):
f (λt−1)πt−1 = Et−1[f (λt(λt−1,πt−1,πt))(πt−1 + πt−1εt + κf (λt−1)πt−1)]
− τπt−1 + πt−1 + Et−1[κ]f (λt−1)πt−1
f (λt−1)=Et−1[f (λt(λt−1,πt−1,πt))(1 + εt + κf (λt−1))] − τ +1+Et−1[κ]f (λt−1). (9)
I will show in a minute that λt (λt−1,πt−1,πt)=λt (λt−1,εt,κ) —t h a ti s ,t h el e v e lo fi n ﬂation can-
cels from the inference problem. This is the consequence of the proportional noise assumption.
Then (9) gives an equation for the function f :
f (λt−1)=λt−1Eε[f (λt (λt−1,ε,κL))(1 + ε + κLf (λt−1))]
+(1− λt−1)Eε[f (λt(λt−1,ε,κH))(1 + ε + κHf (λt−1))]
− τ +1+( λt−1κL +( 1− λt−1)κH)f (λt−1). (10)
Specifying the distribution of ε, one can calculate (or at least set up) the two expected values,
which completes the equation deﬁning f.
Before proceeding, I need to derive the learning rules. Using Bayes’ rule:
λt (λt−1,πt,πt−1)
= P (κ = κL|λt−1,πt,πt−1)=
Pt−1 (κ = κL,πt|πt−1)
Pt−1 (πt|πt−1)
=
Pt−1 (πt|πt−1,κ = κL)Pt−1 (κ = κL|πt−1)
Pt−1 (κ = κL|πt−1)Pt−1 (πt|πt−1,κ = κL)+Pt−1 (κ = κH|πt−1)Pt−1 (πt|πt−1,κ = κH)
.
By deﬁnition, Pt−1 (κ = κL|πt−1)=λt−1 and Pt−1 (κ = κH|πt−1)=1− λt−1.P l u g g i n g t h i s
back:
λt =
λt−1Pt−1 (πt|πt−1,κ = κL)
λt−1Pt−1 (πt|πt−1,κ = κL)+( 1− λt−1)Pt−1 (πt|πt−1,κ = κH)
=
λt−1




The two probabilities can be calculated by recalling πt = πt−1 + πt−1εt + κf (λt−1)πt−1:t h e n









πt−1 − 1 − κxf (λt−1)
´
.I f
the density function of ε is fε, then this probability becomes fε
³
πt
πt−1 − 1 − κxf (λt−1)
´
.
40As of time t − 1, πt = πt−1 (1 + εt + κf (λt−1)).F o rag i v e nκ, λt is the following function
of εt (thus a random variable):
λt(λt−1,πt−1,εt,κ)=
λt−1
λt−1 +( 1− λt−1)
fε(εt+(κ−κH)f(λt−1))
fε(εt+(κ−κL)f(λt−1))
= λt (λt−1,εt,κ). (12)
Then the unconditional distribution of λt (without the assumption of a ﬁxed κ) is the following: it
is equal to λt (λt−1,ε,κL) with probability fε (ε)λt−1,a n dλt (λt−1,ε,κH) with (1 − λt−1)fε (ε).
This establishes the properties of the learning rule which were necessary for deriving (10).
I n s t e a do ft r y i n gt os o l v ef o rf for a given distribution of ε (say, a mean zero normal), let
us proceed in a qualitative, though not fully rigorous manner. The number f (λt−1) is equal to
qt−1
πt−1. Iterating interest parity yields
qt−1 = q∞|t − τπt−1 +( 1− τ)
∞ X
s=t




It looks plausible that a higher λt−1, which means a weaker real exchange rate eﬀect, leads to a
slower disinﬂation, hence, a stronger (more negative, so smaller) initial qt−1. It implies that the
function f is decreasing in λ. One would expect that this feature could be proven in general,
but I have not succeeded. The intuitive logic, however, I ﬁnd clear and convincing.
From this monotonicity, we get that f (λ) is between f (1) and f (0). Let us look at these
two extreme values: both correspond to a degenerate distribution of κ, being equal to κH or
κL, and there is no further learning. It is then easy to derive the corresponding values of f:
if κ = κ∗ for sure, than we are back to a perfect foresight equilibrium with mean zero noise,
which cancels from any expected value calculation. For a given level of κ∗, let us denote the
corresponding value of f by g(κ∗)=g. Then
qt−1 = gπt−1 = gEt−1[πt] − τπt−1 + Et−1[πt]=g(πt−1 + κ∗gπt−1) − τπt−1 + πt−1 + κ∗gπt−1











From the two roots, we must pick the one which is consistent with Et−1π∞ =0 . Substituting
qt−1 = gπt−1 back into the Phillips curve gives us
Et−1πt = πt−1 (1 + κ∗g).
41So we must pick a root between −2
κ∗ and 0. It is clear that the bigger root is positive (using
τ > 1), while the smaller root is less than −1. It is straightforward to check that it stays above
the lower bound as long as κ∗ < 4
1+τ, and this holds for any reasonable choice of τ and κ∗.





κ∗ ,a n df (0) = g(κH), f (1) = g(κL). Since
f (λ) is decreasing, and g is increasing, there is a unique value of κt−1 for every λt−1 such that
f (λt−1)=g(κt−1). This means that one can calculate the realized real exchange rate based
on κt−1, instead of calculating all the complicated expected values for λt−1.I nt h i ss e n s e ,κt−1
is the certainty equivalent of λt−1: picking κt−1 as a point estimate of κ, and forecasting all
future variables with κ = κt−1 and no uncertainty, leads to qt−1 = g(κt−1)πt−1 = f (λt−1)πt−1.
Though all the predicted future real exchange rates, interest rates and inﬂation ﬁgures are biased
predictors, κt−1 is picked in such a way that the resulting qt−1 equals the correct value.
To deﬁne our ﬁnal version of the certainty equivalent, we need to do one extra step. Our
model starts at time t − 1,w i t hπt−1 a n dap r i o rd i s t r i b u t i o nf o rκ,s u m m a r i z e db yλt−1,a n d
an assumption about the true value of κ = κ∗ (this is what the market will learn gradually, but
the inﬂation process is governed by this true value). The time t values of πt and qt are random
variables: they depend on ε. What we want to calculate is the average value of πt and qt for
diﬀerent realizations of ε. Formally, these averages are equal to
e πt = Eε[πt−1 (1 + εt + κ∗qt−1)] = πt−1 + κ∗qt−1
and
e qt = Eε[f (λt(λt−1,εt,κ∗))πt−1 (1 + εt + κ∗qt−1)]
= Eε[f (λt(λt−1,εt,κ∗))](πt−1 + κ∗qt−1)+Eε[f (λt (λt−1,εt,κ∗))εt]πt−1.
Now deﬁne κt such that e qt = g(κt) e πt. It means that if we have the average realization of πt
— which is easy to get, given πt−1, κ∗ and λt−1—, then we can calculate the average realization
of qt by using κt. Having calculated the average realization as of time t, we restart the system
from this average point.
Finally, we want to use that if κ∗ = κH (which corresponds to our pessimistic learning case:
t h et r u ee ﬀect is larger, so true disinﬂation is faster than originally thought), then κt−1 < κt
holds. This looks plausible: when the true real exchange rate eﬀe c ti ss t r o n g e rt h a nc u r r e n t l y
expected, then new data dominantly move the distribution of κ upwards. This higher distribu-
tion leads to a faster expected disinﬂation path, therefore a weaker real exchange rate (relative
42to inﬂation). This argument suggests that the average of
qt
πt should be smaller than f (λt−1).
What we need, however, is not the average of
qt
πt, but the ratio of the two averages. The




f (λt−1)(πt−1 + κHqt−1) <E ε[f (λt (λt−1,εt,κH))πt−1 (1 + εt + κHf (λt−1))]
f (λt−1)(1+κHf (λt−1)) <E ε[f (λt (λt−1,εt,κH))](1 + κHf (λt−1))
+ Eε[f (λt (λt−1,εt,κH))εt].
The number 1+κHf (λt−1) is the average realized speed of disinﬂa t i o n—w h i c hi sl e s st h a n
one, but since it is a quarterly speed, by not too much. All the f (λ) terms are in absolute values
around or greater than one, while the expected value of the product term (εf (λt)) is in general
much smaller (though can be shown to be negative). Note that Eε[f (λt)|κH]=Eε[
qt
πt|κH] —
the average of the ratio of qt and πt. The certainty equivalent κt was deﬁned to match the
ratio of the averages. We can see that the two are quite close to each other, and the comparison
κt−1 < κt is closely related to f (λt−1) <E ε[f (λt)|κH]. Again, though I could not prove formally
that κ∗ = κH implies that κt is increasing, it looks plausible that it holds, at least if the starting
distribution is not too far from the truth.
This property would imply that the average evolution of our variables in the pessimistic
learning case is equivalent to some increasing time path of κt → κH. In principle, the distribution
of ε and the starting value κ0 fully ﬁxes the time path of κt — but for any speciﬁed values of
κ1 < κ2 <...<κT, there is in general a distribution of ε that leads to this evolution of κt (until
time T): select a family of distributions with at least T free parameters (say, moments), then
we get T equations with T unknowns. Unless the distribution family we choose is degenerate,
these T equations should have full rank, so there should be a set of parameters yielding exactly
the prescribed evolution of κt.
There is an alternative, less general but more manageable way to deﬁne the series {κt}.
Starting from a given level of inﬂation, the average realized inﬂation next period coincides with
the realized inﬂation corresponding to εt =0 . So let us consider this series of realized inﬂation:
though the noise in inﬂation is incorporated into parameter estimates, the realization of this
noise is always zero. Deﬁne κt as the certainty equivalent of λt = λt (λt−1,πt−1,εt =0 ) .I nt h i s
case, it is quite simple to establish the desired monotonicity property of κt: all we need is that
zero is the most likely realization of the noise (fε (0) >f ε (x) for all x 6=0— which holds for a
normally distributed noise, for example).
43Suppose that κtrue = κL < κt−1. Then from (12), we have
λt =
λt−1




This is greater than λt−1 exactly when
fε (0) >f ε ((κL − κH)f (λt−1)). (13)
Since f (λt−1) is nonzero (negative), the argument of the right hand side is nonzero (positive), so
(13) is valid. This means that λt > λt−1,t h u sκt < κt−1. A straightforward modiﬁcation of this
argument shows that if κtrue = κH > κt−1,t h e nκt > κt−1. This establishes the monotonicity
of {κt}, though in a more restricted interpretation of the certainty equivalent.
Let us now check the implications of this certainty equivalent approach for the validity of
interest parity. We do know that the average observed real exchange rate follows the path that
we determine with the certainty equivalent. Average realized real interest rates, on the other
hand, are not precisely equal to the values obtained with κt. Denote the average realization of
any variable x by e x, and the certainty equivalent (predicted) value, which is calculated by using
κt,o fx by xf.T h e n
e rt = e it − ^ πt+1|t = τ e πt − ^ πt (1 + Et[κ]qt)=
τπ
f
t − Eε[πt(1 + λt (ε)κLqt +( 1− λt (ε))κHqt)]
= i
f
t − πt (1 + κHqt +( κL − κH)qtEε[λt (ε)])
6= i
f







However, if we get a ﬂat initial real exchange rate, or a further real appreciation following
the initial strengthening, we can be sure that interest parity is violated ex post, since e rt > 0
remains true, so the real exchange rate was expected to depreciate. The numerical diﬀerence
between r
f
t and the realized real exchange rate movement, however, is not equal to the average
ex post deviation from real interest parity.




t .O n ea l s on e e d s
to check the certainty equivalent values of the nominal exchange rate, s :
e st = ^ qt + pt = e qt + p0 +
t X
s=1
f πs = q
f







44so the nominal exchange rate is ﬁne. This means that the diﬀerence between realized nominal
exchange rate movements and i
f
t is equal to the average deviation from nominal interest parity.
Finally, let me illustrate the extra diﬃculties this approach would be facing if there was any
simultaneity in the Phillips curve: suppose that the system is given by
πt = πt−1 (1 + εt)+κqt
qt = qt+1|t − τπt + πt+1|t.
Again, we want to look for a solution of the form qt = f (λt)πt:s i n c eqt depends directly on πt,
it will be determined using the updated distribution for κ.T h e n
πt = πt−1 (1 + εt + κf (λt)πt)
πt =
πt−1 (1 + εt)
1 − κf (λt (λt−1,εt))
.
The signal extraction problem leads to the same expression as in (11). The conditional proba-
bility P = P (πt|πt−1,λt−1,κ∗), however, will turn out to be problematic:
P = P
µ
πt−1 (1 + εt)




T h ei s s u ei st h a tλt also contains εt, so the realization πt is a complicated function of εt.F o ra
given πt, there should be a unique εt being compatible with a ﬁxed value of κ∗, but this one to
one mapping depends on the updating rule λt (λt−1,εt,κ∗). So in the expression for the learning
rule, λt (λt−1,εt,κ∗), both sides will contain this function.
In fact, we were having a similar issue for the πt = πt−1 (1 + εt)+κqt−1 Phillips curve as well:
λt (λt−1,εt,κ∗) contained the real exchange rate function f (λt−1),a n dt h ee q u a t i o nf o rf (λt−1)
contained λt (λt−1,εt,κ∗). There, however, the system was recursive: we could substitute the
learning rule into the interest parity equation and get a single equation deﬁning f (λt−1),a n d
then plug the result back into the learning rule. Here, the two equations are not recursive.
All this means that it would be quite hopeless to prove all the necessary properties of the
certainty equivalent approach for a forward looking and highly simultaneous Phillips curve, like
πt =( α + εt)πt−1+(1− α)πt+1|t+κqt. Still, it looks plausible that the average behavior of this
system under the true learning process is closely resembled by the certainty equivalent results.
Since this more complex Phillips curve enables a bigger role for inﬂation surprises, I will use
this speciﬁcation for my numerical simulations, keeping in mind that those results might be
45quantitatively diﬀerent from the outcome of the true learning process. I believe, however, that
the qualitative behavior of the two systems is quite similar.
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